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ABSTRACT 
 
Our psychobiological nature is characterized paradoxically by our limitedly having and not hav-
ing free will — our having this will and being subject to causes understood scientifically. Both 
characteristics are necessary for an intelligible ethics, politics, and political science. In particular, 
political science as a science must admit of our behavior being partially caused and of political 
rights and responsibilities in virtue of our limited free will. Admitting of either only this will or 
only the determinism is a central error of modern totalitarian ideology.    
 
 
1. A view of human nature inspired by Immanuel Kant continues to skew science, 
ethics and politics: Insofar as a causal principle is presupposed by scientific inquir-
ies about our behavior, our behavior is excluded from moral inquiries that pre-
suppose our free choice of will. And insofar as this will is supposed, the inquiries 
of science are equally precluded. In short, the presupposed judgments that ‘all 
behavior is caused’ and that ‘all persons are free agents’ are held to be logically in-
consistent and mutually exclusive:1 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 For example, see Howard Smith’s Let There be Light: Modern Cosmology and Kabbalah 
(Novato, CA: New World Library, 2006), p. 183. The logical inconsistency is allegedly resolved 
by Kant’s relegation of ‘free will’ to something affirmed by practical reason. This reason as-
sumes for practical purposes that there is free will. That is, despite being unable to show how 
our will is consistent with a causally deterministic science (quantum physics being deterministic 
of probabilities), we must act as if we have free will for the sake of morality. Dr. Smith, a senior 
astrophysicist at the Harvard Smithsonian Center, typifies this Kantian shift: “Even were a con-
ceptual breakthrough to someday prove we do not actually have free will, we may still need to 
act as though we do. Taking responsibility by acting as if there is free will, whether proven or 
not, is part of being aware.” Precisely, the point herein is that to be aware incontrovertibly of 
our behavior is to be implicitly aware of our limited will to either behave or not behave in given 
ways. Free will is not proven in some formally deductive manner. Rather, it is established by 
appealing to the integrity of our immediate phenomenological experience; the experience of 
our limited free will, as discussed below, being as necessary for a coherent ‘truth’ in science as 
our limitedly being understood scientifically is for a coherent ‘truth’ in ethics! 
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Besides being mutually exclusive because inconsistent, the judgments are held 
to be a priori in terms of being supposed prior to the inquiries. Hence either a vi-
cious circle arises if the inquiries are held to establish their truth or their truth is 
undercut by a notorious K-K Thesis: We cannot Know we Know because ‘knowl-
edge’ afforded by the inquiries presupposes judgments that are not known to be 
empirically or otherwise non-trivially true. Thus the truth-less judgments are rele-
gated to an unknowable metaphysics.2 Indeed, Kant took refuge from this theo-
retical problem in his Critique of Pure Reason, in which “knowledge… is possible 
a priori, though only from a practical point of view”,3 in his Critique of Practical 
Reason. The latter became the central apologetics for the practicality of applied 
studies. Today, these studies range from business and health-care ethics to ethnic 
and women’s studies.4 However, their practical focus tends to blind one to the 
                                                 
2 The metaphysical judgments, following Kant, are understood as being both a priori and syn-
thetic. Insofar as the judgments are synthetic, they are not logically true because their subject 
and predicate concepts are different, say ‘events’ and ‘causes’ as well as ‘persons’ and ‘free 
agents’.  And inasmuch as the judgments are a priori, they are supposed prior to the inquiries 
for their intelligibility and cannot be shown by them to be empirically true — precisely, our free 
agency being relegated by Kant to a Noumenon (a mere possible reality). The Anglo-American 
heirs of Kant disregarded approaches of both phenomenology and modal logic for certifying 
the truth of the judgments. For these approaches, see Robert C. Trundle’s A Theology of Sci-
ence: From Science to Ethics to an Ethical Politics (Boca Raton, FL: BrownWalker Press, 
2007). 
3 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Tr. by N. K. Smith, Unabridged Edition (NY: 
Macmillan & Co., 1965), p. 25. 
4 In regard to an unknowable metaphysics that undercuts truth-claims of applied ethics, for in-
stance, see Robert C. Trundle’s “Is There Any Ethics in Business Ethics?” Journal of Business 
Ethics, 8 (1989) No. 3-4, pp. 261-269. Applied ethicist Richard T. De George, President of the 
Central Division of American Philosophical Association 1989-90, never explained how the 
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seeming theoretical problem of there being no known ‘truth’ that can be defended 
epistemologically!  
Consequently, epistemological defenses were often replaced by slogans to 
zealously pursue the practical. For example, Karl Marx exalted the practical and 
eschewed the theoretical when he proclaimed that philosophy should not just in-
terpret the world differently but change it. Yet change without the epistemic de-
fense is blind and dangerous, as political ideologies in the twentieth century bear 
mute witness. And the danger is aggravated by scientific truth-claims being no 
more coherent apart from our having free will than claims in ethics are without 
admitting of causal influences on our behavior to evaluate praise and blame. How 
can we be blamed entirely for being unsociable, for instance, if we suffer from a 
manic depression whose behavioral effects are known medically? In struggling to 
be sociable, would we not be morally heroic and deserve praise? But a coherence 
of the praise in limitedly overcoming the scientifically predictable behavior is intel-
ligible only insofar as we are aware of our behavior and thus implicitly aware of 
our limited will to try to behave sociably.  
Finally, societal praise and blame notwithstanding, another compelling case 
can be made for a freely choosing element of our nature. Unless our nature is at 
least limitedly characterized by our having free choice of will, logically inconsistent 
truth-claims would be equally true because equally caused. That is, if we were sub-
ject to an entirely determined reality, then this reality would be the truth-condition 
for truth. And the contrary truth-claims that all claims are determined and that no 
claims are determined would both be equally true. In short, our limited free will is 
as necessary for intelligible scientific inquiries as a limited determinism is for 
moral inquiries. And although these inquiries may have sub-contrary presupposi-
tions that can both be true, whereby some behavior is freely chosen and some is 
not, it is typical for all behavior to be limitedly both chosen and not chosen (via 
exactly or inexactly measurable causes presupposed by science). But this inconsis-
tency arises from an immediate, incontrovertible, and phenomenological experi-
ence of our selves and not a priori by imposing either ideas or judgments on our 
nature.5  
A schema depicts our nature in terms of viable moral and scientific inquiries: 
 
 
 
 
__________________ 
‘truth’ is not undercut in his retort, "There is Ethics in Business Ethics; But There's More As 
Well," Journal of Business Ethics, 8 (1989) No. 5, pp. 337-339. See my rejoinder to his retort in 
"Business, Ethics, & Business Ethics: Second Thoughts on the Business-Ethics Revolution," 
Thought: A Review of Culture and Idea, 66, No. 262, (1991) pp. 297-309. 
5 See Robert C. Trundle’s "Physics and Phenomenology," New Horizons in the Philosophy of 
Science, Ed. by Dr. David Lamb, Medical School, University of Birmingham (London: Ashgate 
Publishing Co., 1992), pp. 66-86. 
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2. Let us recall that we do not demand that phenomena abide by the Principle of 
Non-Contradiction, expressed ~(p Λ~p). Rather we demand that our statements 
about phenomena are in accord with the Principle! The Principle may be violated 
rationally, nevertheless, when inconsistent truth-claims are inferred from an ex-
perienced reality, as when we infer that we really are limitedly both free and not 
free from our immediate and irrefutable experience of ourselves; for example, 
when we are conscious of our being caused to fall on a bus when it suddenly stops 
but are, at the same time, aware also of our willing to not fall by putting out our 
hands. This point underscores some limitations of logic.  
In terms of logic, there is nothing self-contradictory in asserting that reality 
need not abide by the Principle of Non-contradiction. Its tenable violations are il-
lustrated from the Scripture which says that Christ was both man and not man 
(God) to St. Augustine noting that we are undeniably aware of ourselves as both 
one and not one life (body, will, and mind),6 to physicist Saul Youssef’s point that 
light both is and is not a particle (wave),7 and to juries in courtrooms who weigh 
freely chosen behavior against its scientifically understood causes.  
                                                 
6 Cf. St. Augustine, Confessions, Tr. by R. S. Pine-Coffin (Middlesex, UK: Penguin Books Ltd., 
1984), p. 318. 
7 Saul Youssef, “Is Quantum Mechanics An Exotic Probability Theory?” Fundamental Prob-
lems in Quantum Theory: A Conference Held in Honor of Professor John A. Wheeler, Ed. by 
D.M Greenberger and A. Zeilinger (NY: Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1995), 
p. 904. Consider this widely ignored but important point: Youseff does not appeal to inconsis-
tent theoretical constructs apart from evidence. He is not allowing for an epistemic relativism 
that was feared misguidedly by Sir Karl Popper. Popper confused a top-down reasoning from 
Unfettered free 
choice of will 
  
Unqualified 
determinism  
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In courts of law, for example, defense attorneys may posit causes of behavior 
by psychiatric testimony that mitigates culpability. And prosecutors may stress that 
the same behavior was consciously chosen and warrants punishment. A jury can 
decide that punishment is justified if causal influences are not deemed to outweigh 
a defendant’s will to do what is right. Conversely, doing the right thing may be 
largely rendered moot by physiological or environmental causes, in spite of free 
will, in a jury’s ruling. This archetypal example bears on an undeniable but para-
doxical experience of our selves. 
The foregoing reflects the legal communities of open societies that avoid a 
one-dimensional human nature. An apologetics for fascism, by contrast, affirmed 
an unfettered free will for the will-to-power of Übermenschen (supermen, demi-
gods, or leaders) to creatively shape ‘truth’ in order to deny the inconsistent causal 
determinism.8 But the determinism was affirmed by Marxian science, its dialectic 
notwithstanding, to both explain how dominating classes can cause our truth-
claims and avoid the inconsistency of free will. Both a supposed freedom to create 
moral truth and the notion that this truth is related deterministically to the end of 
history, whereby whatever impedes the end is bad and whatever promotes it is 
good (including terrorism), are ineluctably linked to the heinous justification of 
mass murder. Leaving over 100 million persons dead in the twentieth century by 
ignoring our full nature and rendering senseless any conscionable common-sense 
ethics, these practical ideologies sprang in part from ignoring the theoretical prob-
lems of ‘truth’. And they reveal profound lessons.  
These lessons range from ethicists needing to admit of causes and scientists of 
free will to the possibility that inconsistent empirical properties can be ascribed to 
reality by science, despite an alleged burden to philosophers of science of an Un-
derdetermination-of-Theory-by-Data (UTD) Thesis. In terms of this Thesis, all 
scientific theories admit of logically inconsistent but empirically equivalent rival 
theories. But why cannot both theories be true? Although it is logically possible 
for the theories to be entirely false when they make systematically true predictions 
in terms of a truth-functional logic, it is an epistemic impossibility in terms of a 
modal logic.9 How would it be possible for the theories to make systematically 
true predictions of phenomena unless the phenomena were reflected truly by the 
theories, at least approximately in a given domain? In sum, admitting that reality 
need not conform to our reason — that reason should not be imposed on reality — 
is as necessary for scientific truth as it is for truth in ethics and politics. In regard 
__________________ 
logically inconsistent theoretical constructs to reality, allowing a priori for inconsistent truth-
claims, with a bottom-up reasoning from evidence to the constructs. See Popper’s Quantum 
Theory and the Schism in Physics (NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1982), p. 142. 
8 Cf. Robert C. Trundle’s “Cold-War Ideology: An Apologetics for Global Conflict?” Res Pub-
lica: Belgian Journal of Political Science, Leuven Politologisch Instituut, 37 (1996) 61-84. 
9 For a discussion of this modal reasoning in science, see Robert C. Trundle’s “A First Cause 
and the Causal Principle: How the Principle Binds Theology to Science,” Philosophy in Sci-
ence X. Ed. W. Stoeger, S.J., Ph.D. Astrophysics, Cambridge University. Kraków: Papal Acad-
emy of Theology, Vatican Astronomical Observatory & University of Arizona, 2003, 107-135. 
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to politics in particular, political science as a science must presuppose that all be-
havior is limitedly subject to causes and, at the same time, acknowledge political 
rights and responsibilities that presuppose the limited free will of citizens. The 
logical attempts by intellectuals to make “all things clear,” as Albert Camus once 
lamented, do not merely ignore the indisputable experience we have of our selves 
and the world. Also, the attempts defeat an epistemological humility that is neces-
sary for a humane human condition. 
 
 
 
 
